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Abstract 
In 2011, Huang et al. proposed an anonymous batch authenticated and key agreement scheme for value-added 
services in vehicular Ad Hoc networks (VANETs). Unfortunately, we show that Huang et al.'s batch authenticated 
and key agreement scheme is insecure against conspiracy attack. In order to avoid conspiracy attack, we improved 
Huang et al.'s scheme. Through analysis, the improved scheme can stand against conspiracy attack. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Harbin University 
of Science and Technology. 
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1. Introduction 
Vehicular Ad-hoc networks (VANETs) have attracted extensive attentions in recent years for their 
promises in revolutionizing thehuman driving modes and transportation systems.  Smart vehicles have 
embedded computers, Global Positioning System (GPS), short-range wireless network interfaces, and 
potentially wireless access to the internet. With these equipments, vehicles can communicate with each 
other (V2V:Vehicle-to-Vehicle) or with roadside units (RSU) which are connected to the internet (V2I: 
Vehicle-to-Infrastructure). Vehicular communication over the wireless medium employs the Dedicated  
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Short Range Communications protocol (DSRC)[1]. 
The security and efficiency in VANETs face many challenges due to the open broadcasting of wireless 
communications and the high-speed mobility of the vehicles. To satisfy the security and efficiency 
requirements, it is prerequisite to develop a suite of elaborate protocols to achieve security, privacy, and 
efficient message authentication before vehicular networks can be practically deployed. The robustness 
and efficiency is the two basic requirements for the strong authentication in VANETs [2][3][4]. Message 
authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation, as well as privacy preservation are identified as primary 
requirements.  
To address the aforesaid security and performance issues, many researchers designed many 
authentication and key agreement schemes for VANNETs. In 2009, Jiang et al. proposed a robust and 
efficient signature scheme for V2I communications, called binary authentication tree (BAT) [5]. In 2010, 
Bhattacharjee proposed a four entities mutual authentication technique for vehicle Ad Hoc network [6]. In 
order to authenticate multiple requests sent from different vehicles and establish different session keys for 
different vehicles at the same time, Huang et al. introduce an anonymous batch authenticated and key 
agreement (ABAKA) scheme for value-added services in vehicular Ad Hoc networks in 2011 [7]. 
Compared with the current key agreement scheme, ABAKA can efficiently authenticate multiple requests 
by one verification operation and negotiate a session key with each vehicle by one broadcast message. To 
deal with the invalid request problem, they also proposed a detection algorithm. In their paper, they 
proved a proposition "Batch verification is successful if and only if all individual requesters are valid" 
(i.e., Proposition 1 on page 255). However, we found that Huang et al.'s scheme is insecure through 
cryptanalysis. The proposition 1 does not hold in their paper. The corresponding attack method is also 
given. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, the review of Huang et al.'s scheme is 
given. In section III, the attack method and improvements are presented. The conclusions are given in 
section IV. The notations throughout this paper are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Notations and Descriptions 
Notations Descriptions
Vi, RSU, SP The ith vehicle,  a roadside unit, a service provider 
RVID, SID The real identity of a vehicle and the service provider respectively 
P, q The generator and order of the cyclic group 
v The private secret of the tamper-proof device 
PKSP, RKSP The SP's public key and private key 
PWD A password to activate a tamper-proof device 
IDi A pseudo identity of the vehicle V_i 
IDi
j A part of the IDi, where j=1, 2   and IDi =( IDi
1|| IDi
2)
mrk A master private key 
CRKi A corresponding private key of the vehicle Vi
T,  △T The timestamp, the predefined endurable transmission delay 
KP The key parameter used for key agreement 
h(·),H(·) Collision-free one-way hash function  h:{0,1}*→Zq* ; H: {0,1}*→G
2. Huang et al.'s scheme for value-added services in VANETs 
2.1. System initiation 
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Let G  be a cyclic additive group generated by P  with the order q . SP randomly chooses 
*
qv Z∈  as 
the private secret and will be loaded in the vehicles' tamper-proof devices. Each vehicle is preloaded with 
the public parameters { , , , , (), ()}SPG q P PK h H  and { , ( || )}v mrk h v SID=  are preloaded in the tamper-proof 
device.  
2.2. Pseudoidentity generation 
Authentication module: A user inputs its real vehicle identity RVIDi G∈  and *{0,1}iPWD ∈  to pass 
the verification of the authentication. If both RVIDi  and iPWD  are valid, RVIDi  is delivered to the next 
module; otherwise, the tamper-proof device refuses to activate itself. 
Pseudoidentity generation module: For the purpose of anonymity, a random pseudo identity RVIDi  is 
generated.  Each IDi  comprised two parts 
1IDi  and 
2IDi . Chooses a random number 
*
i qw Z∈  to create a 
point ( , )i i i iR x y w P= = . Let 1ID ( )i ih R=  and 2 1ID ( || )i i iRVID H v ID= ⊕ . Finally, the tamper-proof 
device sends IDi  to the private key generation module. 
 Private key generation module: Based on the pseudo identity IDi , the corresponding private key 
CRK i  is set to be h(ID || )i v P .
At last, 
iV  can store a list of random point iR  and pseudo identities 
1 2||i i iID ID ID=（ ） with its 
corresponding private keys CRK i .
2.3. Batch authentication and key agreement   
Request Procedures: 
iV  obtains a random point iR G∈ , a pseudo identity iID , and the corresponding 
private key CRK i , as well as the master private key mrk . iV  performs the procedures as follows. iV  first 
generates ( )i it h T= , where x  denotes the current timestamp. Then, it computes i i i iM R t CRK= +  and 
( )i iF mrk x P= ⋅ , where ix  is the x  coordinate of point iR . Finally, it delivers the request packet 
( , , , )i i i iID M F T  to the SP with the help of the neighbouring RSU. 
Vehicle Verification and Key Agreement Procedures:  
1) Single-request authentication 
Given the request ( , , , )i i i iID M F T  from iV , the SP performs five steps as follows. 
1.1) The SP checks whether 
nowSP i
T T TΔ ≥ −  is valid, where TΔ  is the predefined endurable 
transmission delay. If yes, then go to step 1.2); otherwise, the SP ceases this connection. 
1.2) The SP computes ( || )i iCRK h ID v P=  and ( )i it h T= . Then, the SP computes ˆi i i iR M t CRK= − ,
where ˆ ˆ ˆ( , )i i iR x y=  and verifies whether ˆ( ( || ) )i iF h v SID x P= ⋅  holds or not. If so, then go to the next step; 
otherwise, this connection terminated. 
1.3)For mutual authentication, the SP picks a random number *
qz Z∈   and computes SPR zP= . Next, 
the SP also signs { , }SP SPR T , where SPT  denotes the SP's current timestamp, to produce an elliptic curve 
digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) signature 
SPσ .
1.4) The SP can negotiate the session key ˆ
SPi i iSK zR zw P= =  to protect the subsequent 
communications. It sends the values ( , , )SP SP SPR T σ  back to the requesting vehicle. 
2) Batch verification and key agreement 
    Given n  distinct requests denoted as 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( , , , ), ( , , , ), , ( , , , )n n n nID M F T ID M F T ID M F TL  sent from 
1 2, , , nV V VL , respectively. The SP performs the steps as follows. 
2.1) The SP checks whether 
nowSP i
T T TΔ ≥ −  is valid, where TΔ  is the predefined endurable 
transmission delay. If yes, then go on; otherwise, the SP ceases this connection. 
2.2) The SP computes ( || )i iCRK h ID v P= , (for 1 i n≤ ≤ ) and extracts the random point 
ˆ
i i i iR M t CRK= − , where ˆ ˆ ˆ( , )i i iR x y=  for 1 i n≤ ≤ .
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F=∑  and computes 1 ˆn ii x=∑  to verify whether 
1 1
ˆ( || )( )
n n
i ii i
F h v SID x P= ==∑ ∑  is valid or not. If so, then go to the next step; otherwise, this connection 
terminated. 
2.4) For mutual authentication, the SP picks a random number *
qz Z∈  and produces a point SPR zP= .
By the SP's private key 
SPRK , the SP also signs { , }SP SPR T  to generate ECDSA signature SPσ .
2.5) The SP negotiates the session keys ˆ
SPi i iSK zR zw P= =  with iV , where 1 i n≤ ≤ , to protect the 
subsequent communications. Then, it broadcasts{ , , }SP SP SPR T σ  back to the vehicles. 
Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement Procedures: 
Given the response packet { , , }SP SP SPR T σ  sent from the SP, iV  authenticates the validity of the SP and 
negotiates a session key as follows. 1) 
iV  checks whether nowSP iT T TΔ ≥ −  is valid, where TΔ  is the 
transmission delay, and 
nowV
T  is V 's receiving time. If not, this session is dropped; otherwise, iV  verifies 
the signature 
SPσ . If SPσ  is legal, iV  goes to the next step; otherwise, this connection terminated. 2) iV
computes the session key 
SPi i SP iSK w R w zP= =  to encrypt the messages in the subsequent 
communications. 
3. Conspiracy attack and improvements on Huang et al.'s scheme 
3.1. Conspiracy attack 
Suppose the two users 
kU  and jU  want to get value-added services from SP without paying the 
expenses. They pre-concert a random point *R G∈ . When they get into the same RSU, kU  and jU  launch 
their tamper-proofs 
kV  and jV  to perform the request procedures as follows. 
If
kV  outputs the request ( , , , )k k k kID M F T , kU  can incepted this request and modified it into 
( , , , )k k k kID M F R T− . Then, kU  sends ( , , , )k k k kID M F R T−  to RSU. At the same time, if jV  outputs the 
request ( , , , )j j j jID M F T , kU  can also incepted this request and modified it into ( , , , )j j j jID M F R T+ .
Then, 
kU  sends ( , , , )j j j jID M F R T+  to RSU. 
Suppose n  distinct requests sent from 1 2, , , nV V VL , respectively. The SP performs the steps as 
follows.1)The SP checks whether 
nowSP i
T T TΔ ≥ −  is valid for 1 i n≤ ≤ . According to the modification 
procedure, the n  distinct times can pass the checking. 2)The SP computes ( || )i iCRK h ID v P=  and 
extracts the random point ˆ







( )kF R+ −  and computes 1 ˆ
n
ii
x=∑  to verify whether 1n ii F= =∑ 1 ˆ( || )( )n iih v SID x P=∑  is val d or not. If the 
users except for ,j kU U  are honest, the checking holds, i.e., the modified request messages can pass the 
authentication. 4) For mutual authentication, the SP picks a random number *
qz Z∈  and produces a point 
SPR zP= . SP also signs ,SP SPR T  to generate ECDSA signature SPσ . 5)The SP negotiates the session keys 
ˆ
SPi i iSK zR zw P= =  with iV to protect the subsequent communications. It broadcasts ( , , )SP SP SPR T σ  back to 
the vehicles. 6)The two conspiracy attackers check whether 
nowSP i
T T TΔ ≥ −  is valid. If not, this session is 
dropped; otherwise, ,j kV V  verify the signature SPσ . If SPσ  is legal, ,j kV V  go to the next step; otherwise, 
this connection terminated. 7) ,j kV V  compute the session key SPi i SP iSK w R w zP= =  to encrypt or decrypt 
the messages in the subsequent communications. 
Notes: From the above conspiracy attack, we know that ,j kU U  can pass the batch authentication. But, 
when SP queries them to pay for the value-added services, they can refuse to pay expenses because 
( , , , )j j j jID M F R T+  and ( , , , )k k k kID M F R T−  can not pass the authentication. Any 2t ≥  can also 
perform this attack in the similar method. Thus, Huang et al.'s Proposition 1 does not hold. 
3.2. Improvements 
Our improvements only focus on batch authentication and key agreement. 
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2*) Improved batch verification and key agreement 
Given n  distinct requests denoted as ( , , , )i i i iID M F T  sent from iV , 1 i n≤ ≤ , respectively. The SP 
performs the steps as follows. 
2.1*) The SP checks whether 
nowSP i
T T TΔ ≥ −  is valid, where TΔ  is the predefined endurable 
transmission delay. If yes, then go on; otherwise, the SP ceases this connection. 
2.2*) The SP computes ( || )i iCRK h ID v P= , (for 1 i n≤ ≤ ) and extracts the random point 
ˆ
i i i iR M t CRK= − , where ˆ ˆ ˆ( , )i i iR x y=  for 1 i n≤ ≤ .
2.3*) The SP randomly chooses *
i qv Z∈  for 1 i n≤ ≤  and computes 1
n
i ii
v F=∑  and 1 ˆn i ii v x=∑ . Then SP 
verifies whether 
1 1
ˆ( || )( )
n n
i i i ii i
v F h v SID v x= ==∑ ∑  is valid or not. If so, then go to the next step; otherwise, 
this connection terminated. 
2.4*)For mutual authentication, the SP picks a random number *
qz Z∈  and produces a point SPR zP= .
By the SP's private key 
SPRK , the SP also signs ,SP SPR T  to generate ECDSA signature SPσ .
2.5*)The SP negotiates the session keys ˆ
SPi i iSK zR zw P= =  with iV  to protect the subsequent 
communications. 
2.6*)The SP broadcasts ( , , )SP SP SPR T σ  back to the vehicles. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we mounted an original conspiracy attack on Huang et al.'s scheme. The security flaw 
results inlose of SP. Our attack means that further researches are needed to construct more secure and 
efficient anonymous batch authenticated and key agreement scheme in VANETs. In addition, an 
improvement of Huang et al.'s scheme was proposed against the attack. 
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